Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning: A dynamic revenue equivalence theorem

Krishnamurthy R Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Auctions are observed as a market mechanism in a wide range of economic transactions involving repeated interactions among the market participants: sponsored search markets run by Google and Yahoo!, online marketplaces such as eBay and Amazon, crowdsourcing, etc. In many of these markets, the participants typically have incomplete information; for example, the participants may not know the quality of the good being auctioned or their value for the good. In such settings, repeated interactions among the participants give rise to extremely complex bidder behavior due to the presence of learning among the participants.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2011
Pages1002-1003
Number of pages2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2011
Externally publishedYes
Event2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2011 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Sep 28 2011Sep 30 2011

Publication series

Name2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2011

Other

Other2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2011
CountryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period9/28/119/30/11

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