Matching rules

Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Institutions often utilize matching rules to achieve cooperative outcomes. However, the equilibrium induced by a matching rule may not be socially optimal. After presenting the case in which matching rules yield privately and socially optimal levels of cooperation, this article identifies the conditions which generate inefficient cooperation. Matching rules undershoot (i.e. parties cooperate less than is socially optimal) in one group of cases. In a second, more puzzling case, matching rules overshoot (i.e. parties that interact under a matching constraint are induced to cooperate more than is socially optimal). This paper identifies the conditions for such occurrences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)57-70
Number of pages14
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2008


Dive into the research topics of 'Matching rules'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this