Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

Rebecca Mackelprang; Katarzyna P. Adamala; Emily R. Aurand; James C. Diggans; Andrew D. Ellington; Samuel Weiss Evans; J. L.Clem Fortman; Nathan J. Hillson; Albert W. Hinman; Farren J. Isaacs; June I. Medford; Shadi Mamaghani; Tae Seok Moon; Megan J. Palmer; Jean Peccoud; Elizabeth A. Vitalis; India Hook-Barnard; Douglas C. Friedman

doi:10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324

Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

Rebecca Mackelprang, Katarzyna P. Adamala, Emily R. Aurand, James C. Diggans, Andrew D. Ellington, Samuel Weiss Evans, J. L.Clem Fortman, Nathan J. Hillson, Albert W. Hinman, Farren J. Isaacs, June I. Medford, Shadi Mamaghani, Tae Seok Moon, Megan J. Palmer, Jean Peccoud, Elizabeth A. Vitalis, India Hook-Barnard, Douglas C. Friedman

Genetics, Cell Biology and Development (CBS)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	522-527
Number of pages	6
Journal	ACS Synthetic Biology
Volume	11
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324
State	Published - Feb 18 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
R.M. and J.L.F. were supported by the Department of Homeland Security* under award No. 19STFRG00011-01-00. R.M., E.R.A., and J.L.F. were supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under award No. 1818248. K.P.A. was supported by National Science Foundation awards No. 1807461 and No. 1935372. A.D.E. was supported by Welch Foundation, F-1654. S.W.E. was supported by Schmidt Futures “Ethics in the Lab” grant. N.J.H. was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Bioenergy Technologies Office, and the Office of Science, through contract DE-AC02-05CH11231 between Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the U.S. Department of Energy. F.J.I. was supported by NSF No. EF-1935120 and DOE No. 2011882. T.S.M. was supported by the National Science Foundation under MCB-1714352 and MCB-2001743. M.J.P. was supported by the Open Philanthropy Project; Nuclear Threat Initiative. J.P. was supported by the National Science Foundation Award DBI-1934573.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 American Chemical Society

Keywords

SARS-CoV-2
biosafety
biosecurity
engineering biology
synthetic biology

PubMed: MeSH publication types

Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324

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Mackelprang, R., Adamala, K. P., Aurand, E. R., Diggans, J. C., Ellington, A. D., Evans, S. W., Fortman, J. L. C., Hillson, N. J., Hinman, A. W., Isaacs, F. J., Medford, J. I., Mamaghani, S., Moon, T. S., Palmer, M. J., Peccoud, J., Vitalis, E. A., Hook-Barnard, I., & Friedman, D. C. (2022). Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing. ACS Synthetic Biology, 11(2), 522-527. https://doi.org/10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324

Mackelprang, R, Adamala, KP, Aurand, ER, Diggans, JC, Ellington, AD, Evans, SW, Fortman, JLC, Hillson, NJ, Hinman, AW, Isaacs, FJ, Medford, JI, Mamaghani, S, Moon, TS, Palmer, MJ, Peccoud, J, Vitalis, EA, Hook-Barnard, I & Friedman, DC 2022, 'Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing', ACS Synthetic Biology, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 522-527. https://doi.org/10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324

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abstract = "The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.",

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note = "Funding Information: R.M. and J.L.F. were supported by the Department of Homeland Security* under award No. 19STFRG00011-01-00. R.M., E.R.A., and J.L.F. were supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under award No. 1818248. K.P.A. was supported by National Science Foundation awards No. 1807461 and No. 1935372. A.D.E. was supported by Welch Foundation, F-1654. S.W.E. was supported by Schmidt Futures “Ethics in the Lab” grant. N.J.H. was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Bioenergy Technologies Office, and the Office of Science, through contract DE-AC02-05CH11231 between Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the U.S. Department of Energy. F.J.I. was supported by NSF No. EF-1935120 and DOE No. 2011882. T.S.M. was supported by the National Science Foundation under MCB-1714352 and MCB-2001743. M.J.P. was supported by the Open Philanthropy Project; Nuclear Threat Initiative. J.P. was supported by the National Science Foundation Award DBI-1934573. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 American Chemical Society",

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AU - Ellington, Andrew D.

AU - Evans, Samuel Weiss

AU - Fortman, J. L.Clem

AU - Hillson, Nathan J.

AU - Hinman, Albert W.

AU - Isaacs, Farren J.

AU - Medford, June I.

AU - Mamaghani, Shadi

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AU - Friedman, Douglas C.

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N2 - The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.

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Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

PubMed: MeSH publication types

UN SDGs

Publisher link

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