The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
R.M. and J.L.F. were supported by the Department of Homeland Security* under award No. 19STFRG00011-01-00. R.M., E.R.A., and J.L.F. were supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under award No. 1818248. K.P.A. was supported by National Science Foundation awards No. 1807461 and No. 1935372. A.D.E. was supported by Welch Foundation, F-1654. S.W.E. was supported by Schmidt Futures “Ethics in the Lab” grant. N.J.H. was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Bioenergy Technologies Office, and the Office of Science, through contract DE-AC02-05CH11231 between Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the U.S. Department of Energy. F.J.I. was supported by NSF No. EF-1935120 and DOE No. 2011882. T.S.M. was supported by the National Science Foundation under MCB-1714352 and MCB-2001743. M.J.P. was supported by the Open Philanthropy Project; Nuclear Threat Initiative. J.P. was supported by the National Science Foundation Award DBI-1934573.
© 2022 American Chemical Society
- engineering biology
- synthetic biology
PubMed: MeSH publication types
- Journal Article
- Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
- Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.