Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership

The authors use primary archival records from Lyndon Johnson's presidency to rethink realist theory in international relations concerning leadership of public opinion in foreign policy. Much as the realists expect, Johnson pursued a strategy of opinion leadership that was intended to direct public opinion as he and his administration reacted to the country's international position. Using archival evidence and statistical analysis, the authors examine the relationship between public opinion information that was privately channeled to the White House and several measures of Johnson's behavior including presidential statements and military decisions about bombing and troop deployments. They find that Johnson was unresponsive to public opinion and also generally ineffective in directing public opinion. They conclude that realists' analysis of opinion leadership in representative democracies is inadequate and can lead to impractical prescriptions. What is needed is a theory of foreign policy making that incorporates the complexities of opinion leadership.