Lying in a finitely repeated game

Avner Ben-Ner; Fangtingyu Hu

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109741

Lying in a finitely repeated game

Avner Ben-Ner, Fangtingyu Hu

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2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Do people lie less in repeated interactions with the same partner than in a series of one-shot interactions with strangers? We find that under asymmetric information, senders lie substantially less if paired with the same receiver than when randomly re-matched with different receivers. However, the lying gap diminishes if the receiver is allowed to offer feedback to the sender.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	109741
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	201
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109741
State	Published - Apr 1 2021

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgments: We thank University of Minnesota Department of Work and Organization (United States) for funding.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.

Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Experiment
Feedback
Finitely repeated game
Lying
Stranger–partner

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10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109741

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KW - Stranger–partner

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Lying in a finitely repeated game

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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