Lying in a finitely repeated game

Avner Ben-Ner, Fangtingyu Hu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Do people lie less in repeated interactions with the same partner than in a series of one-shot interactions with strangers? We find that under asymmetric information, senders lie substantially less if paired with the same receiver than when randomly re-matched with different receivers. However, the lying gap diminishes if the receiver is allowed to offer feedback to the sender.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number109741
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume201
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2021
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgments: We thank University of Minnesota Department of Work and Organization (United States) for funding.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.

Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Experiment
  • Feedback
  • Finitely repeated game
  • Lying
  • Stranger–partner

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