Labor Market Powe

David Berger; Kyle Herkenhoff; Simon Mongey

doi:10.1257/aer.20191521

Labor Market Powe

David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1147-1193
Number of pages	47
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	112
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191521
State	Published - Apr 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* Berger: Duke University (email: david.berger@duke.edu); Herkenhoff: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota (email: kfh@umn.edu); Mongey: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Chicago (email: mongey@uchicago.edu). Emi Nakamura was the coeditor for this article. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (award SES-1824422). We thank Costas Arkolakis, Chris Edmond, Oleg Itskohki, Matt Notowidigdo, Richard Rogerson, Jim Schmitz, Chris Tonetti, and Arindrajit Dube for helpful comments. We thank Chengdai Huang for excellent research assistance. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.

Publisher link

10.1257/aer.20191521

Find It

Find It at U of M Libraries

Cite this

@article{e02e3679f7f947d9b9081c888b3c90bc,

title = "Labor Market Powe",

abstract = "We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms{\textquoteright}local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor{\textquoteright}s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)",

author = "David Berger and Kyle Herkenhoff and Simon Mongey",

note = "Funding Information: * Berger: Duke University (email: david.berger@duke.edu); Herkenhoff: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota (email: kfh@umn.edu); Mongey: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Chicago (email: mongey@uchicago.edu). Emi Nakamura was the coeditor for this article. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (award SES-1824422). We thank Costas Arkolakis, Chris Edmond, Oleg Itskohki, Matt Notowidigdo, Richard Rogerson, Jim Schmitz, Chris Tonetti, and Arindrajit Dube for helpful comments. We thank Chengdai Huang for excellent research assistance. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.",

year = "2022",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1257/aer.20191521",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "112",

pages = "1147--1193",

journal = "American Economic Review",

issn = "0002-8282",

publisher = "American Economic Association",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Labor Market Powe

AU - Berger, David

AU - Herkenhoff, Kyle

AU - Mongey, Simon

N1 - Funding Information: * Berger: Duke University (email: david.berger@duke.edu); Herkenhoff: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota (email: kfh@umn.edu); Mongey: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Chicago (email: mongey@uchicago.edu). Emi Nakamura was the coeditor for this article. This research was supported by the National Science Foundation (award SES-1824422). We thank Costas Arkolakis, Chris Edmond, Oleg Itskohki, Matt Notowidigdo, Richard Rogerson, Jim Schmitz, Chris Tonetti, and Arindrajit Dube for helpful comments. We thank Chengdai Huang for excellent research assistance. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.

PY - 2022/4

Y1 - 2022/4

N2 - We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)

AB - We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85128894994&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85128894994&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1257/aer.20191521

DO - 10.1257/aer.20191521

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85128894994

VL - 112

SP - 1147

EP - 1193

JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

SN - 0002-8282

IS - 4

ER -

Labor Market Powe

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Publisher link

Find It

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this