This chapter discusses aspects of human behavior that affect the evolution of insect resistance to management and how a better understanding of this behavior can be used to improve insect resistance management (IRM). While IRM can be thought of in terms of individual farmers, Clark and Carlson (1990) find that individual farmers treat insect resistance as a common property problem, which means they do not have the incentive to manage it appropriately from a societal perspective. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the problem from a public policy perspective. From this perspective, government regulators like the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or stakeholder groups like the Arizona Cotton Growers Association are interested in formulating and implementing IRM policies in order to promote pest management practices that provide a greater benefit to society or association members. Since pest management decisions are ultimately made by farmers, the regulator or stakeholder group can only influence IRM indirectly. This creates what is referred to as a principal-agent problem. The principal would like the agent to use prescribed management strategies that may not be wholly in the interest of the agent. Therefore, the agent's response to the principal's prescription plays an important role in the principal's ability to achieve his/her objectives. This principal agent problem can be further complicated by the fact that farmer decisions are influenced by the decisions of seed, chemical, and other farm input suppliers through which regulators may choose to act.