Information transparency in multi-channel B2B auctions

A field experiment

Yixin Lu, Alok Gupta, Wolfgang Ketter, Eric Van Heck

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

With the large amount of data available via different channels, firms have increasingly viewed information transparency as an important component of their strategy. This paper examines how the disclosure of winners' information affects sellers' revenues in multi-channel, B2B sequential auctions. Using a field experiment, we find that bidders tend to pay higher prices when winners' identities are concealed from public view. At the outset, such finding contradicts the prediction of the well-known linkage principle in auction theory. Our empirical analysis suggests that anonymizing winning bids might discourage tacit collusion and mitigate the declining price trend in these B2B sequential auctions. This paper contributes to the growing literature on information transparency in market design. It also provides valuable insights to practitioners in designing information revelation policies in complex B2B markets.

Original languageEnglish (US)
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Event35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014 - Auckland, New Zealand
Duration: Dec 14 2014Dec 17 2014

Other

Other35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014
CountryNew Zealand
CityAuckland
Period12/14/1412/17/14

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Transparency
Experiments

Keywords

  • Auction design
  • B2B markets
  • Difference-in-Differences
  • Field experiment
  • Information transparency
  • Linkage principle
  • Sequential auctions
  • Tacit collusion

Cite this

Lu, Y., Gupta, A., Ketter, W., & Van Heck, E. (2014). Information transparency in multi-channel B2B auctions: A field experiment. Paper presented at 35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014, Auckland, New Zealand.

Information transparency in multi-channel B2B auctions : A field experiment. / Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; Van Heck, Eric.

2014. Paper presented at 35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014, Auckland, New Zealand.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Lu, Y, Gupta, A, Ketter, W & Van Heck, E 2014, 'Information transparency in multi-channel B2B auctions: A field experiment' Paper presented at 35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014, Auckland, New Zealand, 12/14/14 - 12/17/14, .
Lu Y, Gupta A, Ketter W, Van Heck E. Information transparency in multi-channel B2B auctions: A field experiment. 2014. Paper presented at 35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014, Auckland, New Zealand.
Lu, Yixin ; Gupta, Alok ; Ketter, Wolfgang ; Van Heck, Eric. / Information transparency in multi-channel B2B auctions : A field experiment. Paper presented at 35th International Conference on Information Systems: Building a Better World Through Information Systems, ICIS 2014, Auckland, New Zealand.
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