Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The core

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This paper examines the ex ante core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which state-dependent allocations are required to satisfy incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete contracts or partial commitment. An example is provided in which the incentive compatible core with nontransferable utility is empty; the game fails to be balanced because convex combinations of incentive compatible net trades can violate incentive compatibility. However, randomization of such strategies leads to ex post allocations which satisfy incentive compatibility and are feasible on average. Hence, convexity is preserved in such a model and the resulting cooperative games are balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)527-544
Number of pages18
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number2-3
StatePublished - Mar 1 2003


  • Balancedness
  • Core
  • General equilibrium with asymmetric information
  • Incentive compatability
  • NTU cooperative games


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