Incentive effects of class actions and punitive damages under alternative procedural regimes

Marta Cenini, Barbara Luppi, Francesco Parisi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

In an economic perspective, punitive damages and class actions can be viewed as sharing a common economic function-creating optimal deterrence. Building on Parisi and Cenini (Class actions for Europe: perspectives from law and economics, ELGAR, 2010), we study the effect of alternative procedural regimes on the effectiveness of punitive damages and class actions. Specifically, we compare the workings of punitive damages and class actions in the American and English ("loser-pays ") regimes. Our findings help explain the limited use and late adoption of class actions and punitive damages in Europe.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)229-240
Number of pages12
JournalEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2011

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Class actions
  • Incentives
  • Loser-Pays rule
  • Punitive damages

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