Abstract
Hume argues that we succumb to the vice of prejudice when we fail to correct negative generalizations about social groups in the face of counter-evidence. We are blameworthy for these biases, moreover, even if they are unavoidable. Hume’s theory of doxastic responsibility entails that his own racial prejudices are deserving of condemnation. In contrast, contemporary vice epistemologists are more inclined to absolve agents of culpability for prejudices beyond their control.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Hume and Contemporary Epistemology |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 297-311 |
Number of pages | 15 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781040192924 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2025 selection and editorial matter, Scott Stapleford and Verena Wagner; individual chapters, the contributors.