How Wittgenstein defeated Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment

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Abstract

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that "the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement," (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein's objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)121-146
Number of pages26
JournalSynthese
Volume154
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2007

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