How often do managers withhold information?

Jeremy Bertomeu, Paul Ma, Iván Marinovic

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain, but persistent, information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (1) managers face disclosure frictions 35 percent of the time; (2) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17 percent of the time; and (3) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24 percent of the time. Managers' strategic withholding motives increase investors' uncertainty about earnings by 3 percent. We find that managers' price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third in response to investors' increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)73-102
Number of pages30
JournalAccounting Review
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 2020


  • Disclosure cost
  • Information endowment
  • Management forecasts
  • Strategic withholding
  • Structural estimation
  • Voluntary disclosure


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