Hot money

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

56 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent empirical work on financial crises documents that crises tend to occur when macroeconomic fundamentals are weak; but even after conditioning on an exhaustive list of fundamentals, a sizable random component to crises and associated capital flows remains. We develop a model of herd behavior consistent with these observations. Informational frictions together with standard debt default problems lead to volatile capital flows resembling hot money and financial crises. We show that repaying debt during difficult times identifies a government as financially resilient, enhances its reputation, and stabilizes capital flows. Bailing out governments deprives resilient countries of the opportunity to differentiate themselves from the nonresilient.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1262-1292
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume111
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2003

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Capital flows
Financial crisis
Government
Debt
Macroeconomic fundamentals
Friction
Conditioning
Herd behavior

Cite this

Hot money. / Chari, Varadarajan V; Kehoe, Patrick J.

In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111, No. 6, 01.12.2003, p. 1262-1292.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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