Governance choice on a serial network

Feng Xie, David Levinson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)189-212
Number of pages24
JournalPublic Choice
Volume141
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2009

Keywords

  • Fiscal federalism
  • Governance choice
  • Infrastructure
  • Transportation

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