Friend or foe? Detecting an opponent's attitude in normal form games

Steven Darner, Maria Gini

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

We study the problem of achieving cooperation between two self-interested agents that play a sequence of different randomly generated normal form games. The agent learns how much the opponent is willing to cooperate and reciprocates. We present empirical results that show that both agents benefit from cooperation and that a small number of games is sufficient to learn the cooperation level of the opponent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages1185-1186
Number of pages2
StatePublished - Jan 1 2011
Event10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: May 2 2011May 6 2011

Other

Other10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011
CountryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period5/2/115/6/11

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Implicit Cooperation
  • Multiagent Learning

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