Firm-sponsored general education and mobility frictions: Evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study asks why hospitals provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty. This support is striking because nursing education is clearly general, clearly paid by the firm, and information asymmetries appear minimal. Using AHA and survey data, I find hospitals employing a greater share of their MSA's registered nurses are more likely to provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty, net of size and other institutional controls. Given the institutional context, I interpret this result as unusually specific evidence that technologically general skill training may be made de facto-specific by imperfect and costly mobility.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)149-159
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

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Nursing Faculties
Nursing Schools
Financial Support
Friction
Education
Nursing Education
Nurses
Surveys and Questionnaires

Keywords

  • Firm-sponsored general education
  • Labor Mobility
  • Monopsony and labor market segmentation
  • Nursing Manpower and Shortages
  • Training and education

Cite this

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