Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms: An experiment in team production

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

30 Scopus citations

Abstract

Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This chapter experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team's total contribution. Average group contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, group contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationResearch in Experimental Economics
PublisherJAI Press
Pages85-97
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)0762307021, 9780762307029
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2001

Publication series

NameResearch in Experimental Economics
Volume8
ISSN (Print)0193-2306

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  • Cite this

    Croson, R. T. A. (2001). Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms: An experiment in team production. In Research in Experimental Economics (pp. 85-97). (Research in Experimental Economics; Vol. 8). JAI Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(01)08005-X