Essays caremark as soft law

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This Essay, included in Temple Law Review's symposium issue on Caremark, assesses the influence of “Caremark duties.” Under Caremark, directors have duties to monitor their corporations for wrongdoing. Caremark has been extremely influential; firms spend considerable amounts of time and money “complying” with what are now called Caremark duties. But liability for breach of Caremark duties is exceedingly unlikely, and, in almost all cases, is completely avoidable with only minimal effort, far less than is typically expended. This Essay considers how Caremark can be both influential and legally toothless-that is, how it operates as “soft law.” As soft law, Caremark can have a considerable penumbra beyond what law requires, encompassing other aspects of corporate good citizenship. I argue here that the Caremark penumbra, together with other forces promoting greater attention to societal interests, is bringing about a considerable convergence between profit maximization and corporate social responsibility, broadly construed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)681-697
Number of pages17
JournalTemple Law Review
Volume90
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jun 1 2018

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Law
profit maximization
social responsibility
liability
director
corporation
citizenship
money
firm
time

Cite this

Essays caremark as soft law. / Hill, Claire.

In: Temple Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, 01.06.2018, p. 681-697.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Hill, C 2018, 'Essays caremark as soft law', Temple Law Review, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 681-697.
Hill, Claire. / Essays caremark as soft law. In: Temple Law Review. 2018 ; Vol. 90, No. 4. pp. 681-697.
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