Equity crowdfunding markets have grown exponentially over the last few years. Despite this impressive growth, significant informational asymmetry problems may plague these markets,making themsusceptible to difficulties and evenmarket failure. In this paper,we depart from extant equity crowdfunding research that has focused almost exclusively on the funding success and funding dynamics on platforms to study the effective governance of equity-crowdfunded (ECF) firms and howit relates to these firms success.We propose a conceptual model that identifies a multitude of governance mechanisms (e.g., internal or external and formal or informal) that potentially operate in equity crowdfunding markets to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Further, building on this framework, we offer a roadmap for future research that examines how different governance mechanisms may help in the selection and development of successful ECF firms.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We are grateful to the editors and two anonymous AMP reviewers for helpful suggestions. We acknowledge financial support from the Research Foundation—Flanders [Grant # G012716N].
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