Abstract
Khan's result [7, 8] on equilibrium points of non-atomic games is generalized to a setting where agents' preferences need not be ordered.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 256-266 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Journal of Approximation Theory |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 1989 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:* Current address: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125. + Research partially supported by an NSF grant. * Current address: Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820.
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