TY - JOUR
T1 - Efficient distribution of water between head-reach and tail-end farms in developing countries
AU - Dawande, Milind
AU - Gavirneni, Srinagesh
AU - Mehrotra, Mili
AU - Mookerjee, Vijay
PY - 2013/3
Y1 - 2013/3
N2 - The necessity of surface water for irrigation and its increasing scarcity in developing economies motivate the need for its efficient distribution. The inequity in the distribution of surface water arises because of the relative physical locations of the farms. Head-reach (primary) farms are close to the source, whereas tail-end (secondary) farms are relatively farther. The lack of physical infrastructure implies that water allocated to secondary farms must pass through primary farms. Left to their individual incentives, primary farmers use more than their fair share of water by denying its release to secondary farmers. Such an inequitable sharing results in significantly suboptimal productivity of the farming community as a whole. We propose decentralized, individually rational mechanisms to achieve socially optimal distribution of surface water for a farming community under uncertainty in rainfall, choice of multiple crops, and differing risk-bearing abilities of primary and secondary farmers. We show that the mechanisms can be efficiently computed and highlight the impact of the improved sharing of surface water. We also study the movement of the price of water with its scarcity. Ideas that can help administer the mechanisms in practice are briefly discussed.
AB - The necessity of surface water for irrigation and its increasing scarcity in developing economies motivate the need for its efficient distribution. The inequity in the distribution of surface water arises because of the relative physical locations of the farms. Head-reach (primary) farms are close to the source, whereas tail-end (secondary) farms are relatively farther. The lack of physical infrastructure implies that water allocated to secondary farms must pass through primary farms. Left to their individual incentives, primary farmers use more than their fair share of water by denying its release to secondary farmers. Such an inequitable sharing results in significantly suboptimal productivity of the farming community as a whole. We propose decentralized, individually rational mechanisms to achieve socially optimal distribution of surface water for a farming community under uncertainty in rainfall, choice of multiple crops, and differing risk-bearing abilities of primary and secondary farmers. We show that the mechanisms can be efficiently computed and highlight the impact of the improved sharing of surface water. We also study the movement of the price of water with its scarcity. Ideas that can help administer the mechanisms in practice are briefly discussed.
KW - Incentives and contracts
KW - Logistics and transportation
KW - Nonprofit management
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84881294788&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84881294788&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1287/msom.1120.0414
DO - 10.1287/msom.1120.0414
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84881294788
SN - 1523-4614
VL - 15
SP - 221
EP - 238
JO - Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
JF - Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
IS - 2
ER -