TY - JOUR
T1 - Drivers of successful common-pool resource management
T2 - A conjoint experiment on groundwater management in Brazil
AU - Cooperman, Alicia
AU - McLarty, Alexandra R.
AU - Seim, Brigitte
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2022/5
Y1 - 2022/5
N2 - Carefully designed common-pool resource (CPR) management systems can improve water security, but many NGOs and governments do not have the resources and logistical capacity to implement all important features of a system at once. In addition, users’ perception of management features is important to increase buy-in and adoption of a new system. Which aspects of a commons management system do users perceive to be most important? We conduct a conjoint survey experiment about groundwater management with rural residents in the semi-arid region of Northeast Brazil. We randomly vary five features of a water management system: 1) discussion, 2) social sanctions for overuse, 3) rules and penalties, 4) payment, 5) monitoring and dissemination of conditions to users. Each feature increases perceived likelihood of collective well management and individual water conservation. We find that features act as complements or substitutes; in particular, discussion complements monitoring, and payment substitutes for rules. Our results have implications for how to study and prioritize the features of CPR management systems to improve water security in other rural, semi-arid regions with groundwater reliance when it is infeasible to implement all recommended features.
AB - Carefully designed common-pool resource (CPR) management systems can improve water security, but many NGOs and governments do not have the resources and logistical capacity to implement all important features of a system at once. In addition, users’ perception of management features is important to increase buy-in and adoption of a new system. Which aspects of a commons management system do users perceive to be most important? We conduct a conjoint survey experiment about groundwater management with rural residents in the semi-arid region of Northeast Brazil. We randomly vary five features of a water management system: 1) discussion, 2) social sanctions for overuse, 3) rules and penalties, 4) payment, 5) monitoring and dissemination of conditions to users. Each feature increases perceived likelihood of collective well management and individual water conservation. We find that features act as complements or substitutes; in particular, discussion complements monitoring, and payment substitutes for rules. Our results have implications for how to study and prioritize the features of CPR management systems to improve water security in other rural, semi-arid regions with groundwater reliance when it is infeasible to implement all recommended features.
KW - Common pool resource
KW - Conjoint experiment
KW - Groundwater
KW - Sustainable development
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U2 - 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102512
DO - 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102512
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85126626370
SN - 0959-3780
VL - 74
JO - Global Environmental Change
JF - Global Environmental Change
M1 - 102512
ER -