Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes

Jon McLachlan; Nicholas Hopper

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes

Jon McLachlan, Nicholas Hopper

Computer Science and Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

At Oakland 2005, Murdoch and Danezis described an attack on the Tor anonymity service that recovers the nodes in a Tor circuit, but not the client. We observe that in a peer-to-peer anonymity scheme, the client is part of the circuit and thus the technique can be of greater significance in this setting. We experimentally validate this conclusion by showing that "circuit clogging" can identify client nodes using the MorphMix peer-to-peer anonymity protocol. We also propose and empirically validate the use of the Stochastic Fair Queueing discipline on outgoing connections as an efficient and low-cost mitigation technique.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers
Pages	31-46
Number of pages	16
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3
State	Published - 2008
Event	12th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2008 - Cozumel, Mexico Duration: Jan 28 2008 → Jan 31 2008

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	5143 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	12th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2008
Country/Territory	Mexico
City	Cozumel
Period	1/28/08 → 1/31/08

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10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

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McLachlan, J., & Hopper, N. (2008). Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 31-46). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5143 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes. / McLachlan, Jon; Hopper, Nicholas.
Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers. 2008. p. 31-46 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5143 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

McLachlan, J & Hopper, N 2008, Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes. in Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5143 LNCS, pp. 31-46, 12th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2008, Cozumel, Mexico, 1/28/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

McLachlan J, Hopper N. Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers. 2008. p. 31-46. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-85230-8_3

McLachlan, Jon ; Hopper, Nicholas. / Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes. Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 12th International Conference, FC 2008, Revised Selected Papers. 2008. pp. 31-46 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Don't clog the queue! Circuit clogging and mitigation in P2P anonymity schemes

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