Does the phenomenality of perceptual experience present an obstacle to phenomenal externalism?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience-perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: Ned Block’s Inverted Earth Argument. In the course of carrying out this investigation, I will show that challenging Phenomenal Externalism on phenomenological grounds is not as straightforward a task as it is commonly assumed to be.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)93-110
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Papers
Volume38
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Does the phenomenality of perceptual experience present an obstacle to phenomenal externalism?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this