Abstract
Some claim that recent work in moral psychology both undermines Kantian moral theory and supports Humean approaches to morality. Does moral psychology undermine Kantian, rationalistic moral theory? After distinguishing various Kantian claims and the evidence against them, I argue that the empirical case against Kantianism as a viable moral theory is not conclusive.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Pages | 336-350 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781118657775 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781118657607 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 5 2016 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2016 John wiley & sons, inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Humeanism
- Kantianism
- Moral dumbfounding
- Moral judgment
- Psychopathy
- Rationalism
- Sentimentalism
- Trolley problem