Do banks still monitor when there is a market for credit protection?

Chenyu Shan, Dragon Yongjun Tang, Andrew Winton

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The rise of credit default swaps (CDS) provides creditors with a market-based approach to obtaining protection, but it can also affect lenders' monitoring of the borrowers. We find that after CDS begin trading on a given firm, new loans to that firm are less likely to require collateral and have less strict financial covenants, even controlling for endogeneity. The effects are stronger when lenders have easier access to CDS, for safer firms, credit lines, and performance-based covenants. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that the introduction of CDS trading makes loan contracting more effective for better quality borrowers.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number101241
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Volume68
Issue number2-3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Credit
Credit default swaps
Loans
Covenant
New firms
Monitoring
Contracting
Endogeneity
Access to credit

Keywords

  • CDS
  • Collateral
  • Covenants
  • Credit default swaps
  • Credit protection
  • Monitoring

Cite this

Do banks still monitor when there is a market for credit protection? / Shan, Chenyu; Tang, Dragon Yongjun; Winton, Andrew.

In: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 68, No. 2-3, 101241, 01.11.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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