Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Advancements in information technologies offer opportunities for designing and deploying innovative market mechanisms. For example, combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods, can increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities. However, lack of real-time bidder support tools has been a major obstacle preventing this mechanism from reaching its full potential. This study uses novel feedback mechanisms to aid bidders in formulating bids in real-time to facilitate participation in continuous combinatorial auctions. Laboratory experiments examine the effectiveness of our feedback mechanisms; the study is the first to examine how bidders behave in such information-rich environments. Our results indicate that feedback results in higher efficiency and higher seller's revenue compared to the baseline case where bidders are not provided feedback. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, even in complex economic environments, individuals effectively integrate rich information in their decision making.

Original languageEnglish (US)
StatePublished - Dec 1 2007
Event28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007 - Montreal, QC, Canada
Duration: Dec 9 2007Dec 12 2007

Other

Other28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007
CountryCanada
CityMontreal, QC
Period12/9/0712/12/07

Fingerprint

Feedback
Economics
Information technology
Decision making
Experiments

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Bidder behavior
  • Combinatorial auctions
  • Experimental economics
  • Information feedback

Cite this

Adomavicius, G., Curley, S. P., Gupta, A., & Sanyal, P. (2007). Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions. Paper presented at 28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada.

Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions. / Adomavicius, Gediminas; Curley, Shawn P; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab.

2007. Paper presented at 28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Adomavicius, G, Curley, SP, Gupta, A & Sanyal, P 2007, 'Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions' Paper presented at 28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada, 12/9/07 - 12/12/07, .
Adomavicius G, Curley SP, Gupta A, Sanyal P. Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions. 2007. Paper presented at 28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada.
Adomavicius, Gediminas ; Curley, Shawn P ; Gupta, Alok ; Sanyal, Pallab. / Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions. Paper presented at 28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007, Montreal, QC, Canada.
@conference{8a9a159bf1dc4ae3a3e7c8f1a41529a0,
title = "Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions",
abstract = "Advancements in information technologies offer opportunities for designing and deploying innovative market mechanisms. For example, combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods, can increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities. However, lack of real-time bidder support tools has been a major obstacle preventing this mechanism from reaching its full potential. This study uses novel feedback mechanisms to aid bidders in formulating bids in real-time to facilitate participation in continuous combinatorial auctions. Laboratory experiments examine the effectiveness of our feedback mechanisms; the study is the first to examine how bidders behave in such information-rich environments. Our results indicate that feedback results in higher efficiency and higher seller's revenue compared to the baseline case where bidders are not provided feedback. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, even in complex economic environments, individuals effectively integrate rich information in their decision making.",
keywords = "Auctions, Bidder behavior, Combinatorial auctions, Experimental economics, Information feedback",
author = "Gediminas Adomavicius and Curley, {Shawn P} and Alok Gupta and Pallab Sanyal",
year = "2007",
month = "12",
day = "1",
language = "English (US)",
note = "28th International Conference on Information Systems, ICIS 2007 ; Conference date: 09-12-2007 Through 12-12-2007",

}

TY - CONF

T1 - Design and effects of information feedback in continuous combinatorial auctions

AU - Adomavicius, Gediminas

AU - Curley, Shawn P

AU - Gupta, Alok

AU - Sanyal, Pallab

PY - 2007/12/1

Y1 - 2007/12/1

N2 - Advancements in information technologies offer opportunities for designing and deploying innovative market mechanisms. For example, combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods, can increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities. However, lack of real-time bidder support tools has been a major obstacle preventing this mechanism from reaching its full potential. This study uses novel feedback mechanisms to aid bidders in formulating bids in real-time to facilitate participation in continuous combinatorial auctions. Laboratory experiments examine the effectiveness of our feedback mechanisms; the study is the first to examine how bidders behave in such information-rich environments. Our results indicate that feedback results in higher efficiency and higher seller's revenue compared to the baseline case where bidders are not provided feedback. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, even in complex economic environments, individuals effectively integrate rich information in their decision making.

AB - Advancements in information technologies offer opportunities for designing and deploying innovative market mechanisms. For example, combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can bid on combinations of goods, can increase the economic efficiency of a trade when goods have complementarities. However, lack of real-time bidder support tools has been a major obstacle preventing this mechanism from reaching its full potential. This study uses novel feedback mechanisms to aid bidders in formulating bids in real-time to facilitate participation in continuous combinatorial auctions. Laboratory experiments examine the effectiveness of our feedback mechanisms; the study is the first to examine how bidders behave in such information-rich environments. Our results indicate that feedback results in higher efficiency and higher seller's revenue compared to the baseline case where bidders are not provided feedback. Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, even in complex economic environments, individuals effectively integrate rich information in their decision making.

KW - Auctions

KW - Bidder behavior

KW - Combinatorial auctions

KW - Experimental economics

KW - Information feedback

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84870959459&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84870959459&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Paper

ER -