Abstract
In an important article, McIntosh and Storey (2018) challenge the "acquisition-use presumption" that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would inevitably seek to detonate it in an attack. They argue that a terrorist organization with nuclear weapons has more attractive options than conducting a direct nuclear attack, that organizational politics mean that a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon would be unlikely to seek to detonate it, and that a nuclear attack would escalate the threats the terrorist organization faced. I argue that these arguments are ultimately unpersuasive and that the acquisition-use presumption remains a valid basis for theorizing about the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 774-778 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | International Studies Quarterly |
Volume | 63 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 1 2019 |