Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public record keeping

Dean Corbae, Joe Ritter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

We relax a standard assumption on the matching technology in a search model of money. In particular, agents may remain in a long-term partnership as long as it is in their self-interest. With this simple modification, it is possible to support self-enforcing, intertemporal trade which resembles credit without a public record keeping device. We examine conditions for co-existence of currency and credit and the welfare gains/losses associated with the introduction of money.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)933-951
Number of pages19
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume24
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2004

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Keywords

  • Gift-giving
  • Partnerships
  • Search frictions

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