Decentralized and selfish optimality in mean field problems with nonuniform agents

Petros G. Voulgaris, Nicola Elia

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we take an input-output approach to expand the study of cooperative multi-agent optimization problems that admit decentralized and selfish solutions. We extend the results of our previous work on problems with identical agents to nonidentical agents and demonstrate that for the H and H2 norm minimization, the optimal controller is decentralized and selfish as the number of agents n grows to infinity, provided a uniform boundedness condition on the open loop of the collective is satisfied.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 1963-2012 IEEE.

Keywords

  • Decentralized control
  • Mean Field games

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