Darwinian dynamics and evolutionary game theory

Thomas L. Vincent, Tania L.S. Vincent, Yosef Cohen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Evolutionary games, here modelled by systems of ordinary differential equations, encapsulate Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. An evolutionary game can reach a local minimum, allowing invasion by mutants to drive the system out of its minimum and engender speciation. Games based on optimality considerations do not resist invasion. Nash equilibrium does not resolve to evolutionary stable strategies - mutants can invade existing communities of species.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)215-226
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Biological Dynamics
Issue number3
StatePublished - May 2011


  • Evolutionary games
  • Population dynamics
  • Tutorial


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