Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

Marek Hanusch; Paul M. Vaaler

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.004

Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

Marek Hanusch, Paul M. Vaaler

Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship

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Abstract

Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	251-254
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	119
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.004
State	Published - Jun 2013

Keywords

Credit rating agencies
Elections
Fiscal policy
Political budget cycle

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.004

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title = "Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?",

abstract = "Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain",

keywords = "Credit rating agencies, Elections, Fiscal policy, Political budget cycle",

author = "Marek Hanusch and Vaaler, {Paul M.}",

year = "2013",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.004",

language = "English (US)",

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pages = "251--254",

journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Vaaler, Paul M.

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N2 - Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain

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KW - Elections

KW - Fiscal policy

KW - Political budget cycle

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SP - 251

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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ER -

Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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