Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

Marek Hanusch, Paul M. Vaaler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)251-254
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume119
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2013

Keywords

  • Credit rating agencies
  • Elections
  • Fiscal policy
  • Political budget cycle

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