TY - JOUR

T1 - Cosmic logic

T2 - A computational model

AU - Vanchurin, Vitaly

N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Institute of Physics. All rights reserved.

PY - 2016/2/3

Y1 - 2016/2/3

N2 - We initiate a formal study of logical inferences in context of the measure problem in cosmology or what we call cosmic logic. We describe a simple computational model of cosmic logic suitable for analysis of, for example, discretized cosmological systems. The construction is based on a particular model of computation, developed by Alan Turing, with cosmic observers (CO), cosmic measures (CM) and cosmic symmetries (CS) described by Turing machines. CO machines always start with a blank tape and CM machines take CO's Turing number (also known as description number or Gödel number) as input and output the corresponding probability. Similarly, CS machines take CO's Turing number as input, but output either one if the CO machines are in the same equivalence class or zero otherwise. We argue that CS machines are more fundamental than CM machines and, thus, should be used as building blocks in constructing CM machines. We prove the non-computability of a CS machine which discriminates between two classes of CO machines: mortal that halts in finite time and immortal that runs forever. In context of eternal inflation this result implies that it is impossible to construct CM machines to compute probabilities on the set of all CO machines using cut-off prescriptions. The cut-off measures can still be used if the set is reduced to include only machines which halt after a finite and predetermined number of steps.

AB - We initiate a formal study of logical inferences in context of the measure problem in cosmology or what we call cosmic logic. We describe a simple computational model of cosmic logic suitable for analysis of, for example, discretized cosmological systems. The construction is based on a particular model of computation, developed by Alan Turing, with cosmic observers (CO), cosmic measures (CM) and cosmic symmetries (CS) described by Turing machines. CO machines always start with a blank tape and CM machines take CO's Turing number (also known as description number or Gödel number) as input and output the corresponding probability. Similarly, CS machines take CO's Turing number as input, but output either one if the CO machines are in the same equivalence class or zero otherwise. We argue that CS machines are more fundamental than CM machines and, thus, should be used as building blocks in constructing CM machines. We prove the non-computability of a CS machine which discriminates between two classes of CO machines: mortal that halts in finite time and immortal that runs forever. In context of eternal inflation this result implies that it is impossible to construct CM machines to compute probabilities on the set of all CO machines using cut-off prescriptions. The cut-off measures can still be used if the set is reduced to include only machines which halt after a finite and predetermined number of steps.

KW - ination

KW - initial conditions and eternal universe

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U2 - 10.1088/1475-7516/2016/02/006

DO - 10.1088/1475-7516/2016/02/006

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:84960091650

VL - 2016

JO - Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics

JF - Journal of Cosmology and Astroparticle Physics

SN - 1475-7516

IS - 2

M1 - 006

ER -