Constructivism and Wise Judgment

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In "Constructivism and Wise Judgment", Valerie Tiberius presents in outline a first order constructivist view that sees all-in reasons as constituted by the judgments of a wise person. Tiberius hopes that her discussion will help to shift the focus in the constructivist debate away from semantic and psychological questions and towards epistemological issues.The paper defends three central claims: 1. Practical questions about what we have all-in reason to do are complex and are therefore best addressed by a theory that is both flexible and capable of incorporating a multiplicity of fundamental values without committing in advance to the content of these values. A theory of wisdom promises to satisfy this demand.2. We can develop a theory of wisdom that would be responsive to theoretical constraints central to the constructivist approach: that the theory be authoritative for all agents, that it be empirically sound and that it be action guiding. 3. A theory that views the output of the deliberation of a wise judge as constitutive of solutions to practical problems qualifies as a constructivist theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConstructivism in Practical Philosophy
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191741913
ISBN (Print)9780199609833
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 24 2013

Fingerprint

Constructivism
Constructivist
Wisdom
Fundamental
Multiplicity
Person
Deliberation
Psychological
Epistemological

Keywords

  • Constuctivim
  • Epistemology
  • Judgment
  • Normativity
  • Wisdom

Cite this

Tiberius, V. (2013). Constructivism and Wise Judgment. In Constructivism in Practical Philosophy Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0011

Constructivism and Wise Judgment. / Tiberius, Valerie.

Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Tiberius, V 2013, Constructivism and Wise Judgment. in Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0011
Tiberius V. Constructivism and Wise Judgment. In Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 2013 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609833.003.0011
Tiberius, Valerie. / Constructivism and Wise Judgment. Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2013.
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