Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession policy

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9 Scopus citations


States and international organizations often attempt to influence the behavior of a target government by employing conditionality-i.e., they condition the provision of some set of benefits on changes in the target's policies. Conditionality may give rise to a commitment problem: once the proffered benefits are granted, the target's incentive for continued compliance declines. In this paper, I document a mechanism by which conditionality may induce compliance even after these benefits are distributed. If conditionality alters the composition of domestic interest groups in the target state, it may induce permanent changes in the target government's behavior. I construct a dynamic model of lobbying that demonstrates that conditionality can reduce long-term levels of state capture. And I test the model's predictions using data from the accession of Eastern European countries to the EU.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)387-431
Number of pages45
JournalReview of International Organizations
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 2010
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.


  • Compliance
  • Conditionality
  • Domestic interests
  • European Union
  • Lobbying


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