Computational feedback mechanisms for iterative multiunit multiattribute auctions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Traditionally firms aiming to achieve competition among suppliers have used sealed bidding procedures in their procurement processes. However, the advances in computational technologies now allow companies to use different and more complex auction mechanisms for their sourcing needs. The multiattribute auction is a mechanism that allows negotiation over multiple characteristics of a contract including price as well as non-price attributes. Expected gains include faster negotiation, higher market transparency, and greater allocative efficiency. In this paper, we study the problem of improving information exchange in such auctions. We develop a model of a procurement auction in which the sales item is defined by multiple attributes. We consider the case of partial preference revelation where the buyer provides some feedback to the bidders to aid in their bid formulation but does not disclose her utility function in its entirety. We propose a feedback technique that is based on bid ranks and conduct laboratory experiments to explore the impact of such feedback on bidder strategies and performance. Based on our analysis of obtained experimental data, we propose additional advanced feedback metrics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006
PublisherSocial Science Research Network
Pages205-210
Number of pages6
StatePublished - Jan 1 2006
Event16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006 - Milwaukee, WI, United States
Duration: Dec 9 2006Dec 10 2006

Other

Other16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006
CountryUnited States
CityMilwaukee, WI
Period12/9/0612/10/06

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Feedback
Transparency
Sales
Industry
Experiments

Cite this

Adomavicius, G., Gupta, A., & Sanyal, P. (2006). Computational feedback mechanisms for iterative multiunit multiattribute auctions. In 16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006 (pp. 205-210). Social Science Research Network.

Computational feedback mechanisms for iterative multiunit multiattribute auctions. / Adomavicius, Gediminas; Gupta, Alok; Sanyal, Pallab.

16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006. Social Science Research Network, 2006. p. 205-210.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Adomavicius, G, Gupta, A & Sanyal, P 2006, Computational feedback mechanisms for iterative multiunit multiattribute auctions. in 16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006. Social Science Research Network, pp. 205-210, 16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006, Milwaukee, WI, United States, 12/9/06.
Adomavicius G, Gupta A, Sanyal P. Computational feedback mechanisms for iterative multiunit multiattribute auctions. In 16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006. Social Science Research Network. 2006. p. 205-210
Adomavicius, Gediminas ; Gupta, Alok ; Sanyal, Pallab. / Computational feedback mechanisms for iterative multiunit multiattribute auctions. 16th Workshop on Information Technologies and Systems, WITS 2006. Social Science Research Network, 2006. pp. 205-210
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