COMPARING STUDENTS TO WORKERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FRAMING ON BEHAVIOR IN DISTRIBUTION GAMES

Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Stephen Burks, Eric Verhoogen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

50 Scopus citations

Abstract

To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in "social framing." Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC), and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offers are ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employees are more generous than students in either location. Workers behaved distinctly from both student groups in that their allocations do not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framing of the workplace.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationField Experiments in Economics
EditorsG.W. Harrison, Jeffrey Carpenter, John List
Pages261-289
Number of pages29
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2004
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameResearch in Experimental Economics
Volume10
ISSN (Print)0193-2306

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  • Cite this

    Carpenter, J. P., Burks, S., & Verhoogen, E. (2004). COMPARING STUDENTS TO WORKERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FRAMING ON BEHAVIOR IN DISTRIBUTION GAMES. In G. W. Harrison, J. Carpenter, & J. List (Eds.), Field Experiments in Economics (pp. 261-289). (Research in Experimental Economics; Vol. 10). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-2306(04)10007-0