Studied the effects of commitment to future bargaining in 40 male undergraduate dyads. Ss were randomly assigned to a 2 (bargaining or nonbargaining) * 2 (same person or different person) * 2 (seller or buyer) factorial design and participated in a simulated automobile-trading task, knowing only their own profits on which experimental compensation was based. Results indicate that commitment to future bargaining was associated with more extreme initial bids and, for dyads, less equitable bargaining outcomes. Expectation of future interaction with the same person was associated with lower minimum acceptable profits for Ss, while dyads expecting future interaction together reached more equitable bargaining outcomes. The extent and nature of anticipated future interactions influenced marketing transactions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
- commitment to future bargaining, marketing transactions in dyads, male college students