Civic Action, Idealization, and Kantian Citizenship

This chapter challenges popular portrayals of the Kantian citizen: (1) as rigidly subservient to rules that prohibit lies and political violence, even when violation of these will predictably thwart injustice; and (2) as embodying ideals of freedom, equality, and independence that most persons fail to realize. Toward a conception of the citizen that better fits both Kant’s texts and our circumstances, the chapter first considers the famous essay on the right to lie, which apparently provides good reason to accept both the popular gloss and significant worries that go with it. That essay’s seeming position notwithstanding, it contends, careful analysis of more theoretically rigorous discussions, principally in Kant’s Rechtslehre, suggest a picture both friendlier to citizen autonomy and less idealized than the popular interpretation would have it. Together with an illuminating historical example, this analysis, in turn, supports an alternative reading of Kant’s discussion of the right to lie and a substantially enriched understanding of Kantian citizenship. While Kant himself might not have accepted all the implications drawn from this inquiry, the chapter argues, these are both consistent with central elements of his political theory and very much in the spirit of a thoughtful interpretation of his texts.