Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty

Christopher R. Mcintosh, Jason F. Shogren, Andrew J. Moravec

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We compare behavior in a one-shot Centipede game across several payoff structures including nonlinear payoff tournaments. Assuming Nash to be optimal, results suggest nonlinear tournament payoffs based on overall relative rewards are not sufficient to increase Nash results in the one-shot Centipede style setting. Evidence suggests that reducing strategic uncertainty is more important than increasing dominance in promoting Nash play.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2018-2024
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume29
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009

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