@inproceedings{25ddfb94238142d78ae661032ac60a38,
title = "But who will monitor the monitor?",
abstract = "Consider a group of individuals whose behavior is subject to moral hazard, and suppose that providing them with incentives requires a monitor to detect deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? I study mediated contracts and find that the monitor's deviations are effectively irrelevant. Hence, nobody needs to monitor the monitor. I also characterize exactly when such contracts can provide the right incentives for everyone. In doing so, several new characterizations of virtual implementation are derived.",
keywords = "Mediated contracts, Monitoring, Virtual implementation",
author = "Rahman, {David M.}",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1145/1566374.1566397",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781605584584",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "157",
booktitle = "EC'09 - Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'09 ; Conference date: 06-07-2009 Through 10-07-2009",
}