But who will monitor the monitor?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


Consider a group of individuals whose behavior is subject to moral hazard, and suppose that providing them with incentives requires a monitor to detect deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? I study mediated contracts and find that the monitor's deviations are effectively irrelevant. Hence, nobody needs to monitor the monitor. I also characterize exactly when such contracts can provide the right incentives for everyone. In doing so, several new characterizations of virtual implementation are derived.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC'09 - Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Number of pages1
StatePublished - 2009
Event2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'09 - Stanford, CA, United States
Duration: Jul 6 2009Jul 10 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce


Other2009 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'09
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityStanford, CA


  • Mediated contracts
  • Monitoring
  • Virtual implementation


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