TY - GEN
T1 - Breaking and provably fixing minx
AU - Shimshock, Erik
AU - Staats, Matt
AU - Hopper, Nick
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - In 2004, Danezis and Laurie proposed Minx, an encryption protocol and packet format for relay-based anonymity schemes, such as mix networks and onion routing, with simplicity as a primary design goal. Danezis and Laurie argued informally about the security properties of Minx but left open the problem of proving its security. In this paper, we show that there cannot be such a proof by showing that an active global adversary can decrypt Minx messages in polynomial time. To mitigate this attack, we also prove secure a very simple modification of the Minx protocol.
AB - In 2004, Danezis and Laurie proposed Minx, an encryption protocol and packet format for relay-based anonymity schemes, such as mix networks and onion routing, with simplicity as a primary design goal. Danezis and Laurie argued informally about the security properties of Minx but left open the problem of proving its security. In this paper, we show that there cannot be such a proof by showing that an active global adversary can decrypt Minx messages in polynomial time. To mitigate this attack, we also prove secure a very simple modification of the Minx protocol.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=50249168331&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=50249168331&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-70630-4_7
DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-70630-4_7
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:50249168331
SN - 3540706291
SN - 9783540706298
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 99
EP - 114
BT - Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 8th International Symposium, PETS 2008, Proceedings
T2 - 8th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS 2008
Y2 - 23 July 2008 through 25 July 2008
ER -