Breaking and provably fixing minx

Erik Shimshock, Matt Staats, Nick Hopper

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Scopus citations


In 2004, Danezis and Laurie proposed Minx, an encryption protocol and packet format for relay-based anonymity schemes, such as mix networks and onion routing, with simplicity as a primary design goal. Danezis and Laurie argued informally about the security properties of Minx but left open the problem of proving its security. In this paper, we show that there cannot be such a proof by showing that an active global adversary can decrypt Minx messages in polynomial time. To mitigate this attack, we also prove secure a very simple modification of the Minx protocol.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPrivacy Enhancing Technologies - 8th International Symposium, PETS 2008, Proceedings
Number of pages16
StatePublished - 2008
Event8th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS 2008 - Leuven, Belgium
Duration: Jul 23 2008Jul 25 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5134 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other8th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, PETS 2008


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