Abstract
This paper introduces Truthful Multichannel Auction (TMCA), an auction design for the allocation of wireless channels to several bidders with private information about their channel valuation. Channel allocations are subject to interference constraints in the form of a conflict graph. In contrast to other channel auctions, TMCA allows for variable (instead of fixed) marginal valuations. In TMCA, it is a dominant strategy for bidders to truthfully reveal their channel valuations, which in turn guarantees the implementation of highly efficient allocations in polynomial time. This paper also shows the expected revenue of the auctioneer can be maximized by imposing a reserve price.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | 2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2013 |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
Pages | 3035-3041 |
Number of pages | 7 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781479913534 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2013 |
Event | 2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2013 - Atlanta, GA, United States Duration: Dec 9 2013 → Dec 13 2013 |
Other
Other | 2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2013 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Atlanta, GA |
Period | 12/9/13 → 12/13/13 |