Auction design for spectrum allocation under interference constraints

Jorge Barrera, Alfredo Garcia, Mingyi Hong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper introduces Truthful Multichannel Auction (TMCA), an auction design for the allocation of wireless channels to several bidders with private information about their channel valuation. Channel allocations are subject to interference constraints in the form of a conflict graph. In contrast to other channel auctions, TMCA allows for variable (instead of fixed) marginal valuations. In TMCA, it is a dominant strategy for bidders to truthfully reveal their channel valuations, which in turn guarantees the implementation of highly efficient allocations in polynomial time. This paper also shows the expected revenue of the auctioneer can be maximized by imposing a reserve price.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2013
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages3035-3041
Number of pages7
ISBN (Print)9781479913534
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013
Event2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2013 - Atlanta, GA, United States
Duration: Dec 9 2013Dec 13 2013

Other

Other2013 IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2013
CountryUnited States
CityAtlanta, GA
Period12/9/1312/13/13

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