Asymmetric reporting timeliness and informational feedback

Qi Chen, Zeqiong Huang, Xu Jiang, Gaoqing Zhang, Yun Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms' investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5194-5208
Number of pages15
JournalManagement Science
Issue number8
StatePublished - Aug 1 2021

Bibliographical note

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  • Feedback effect
  • Price informativeness
  • Timely loss recognition


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