Asymmetric reporting timeliness and informational feedback

Qi Chen, Zeqiong Huang, Xu Jiang, Gaoqing Zhang, Yun Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms' investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5194-5208
Number of pages15
JournalManagement Science
Issue number8
StatePublished - Aug 1 2021

Bibliographical note

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  • Feedback effect
  • Price informativeness
  • Timely loss recognition


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