Abstract
Mary Astell (1666–1731) is often described as a Cartesian, given the many similarities between her philosophical commitments and those held by Descartes. However, labeling her as such can obscure her original contributions, especially in epistemology. While male philosophers like Poulain are given the space to develop their own positions, Astell is often seen merely as a spokesperson for Descartes. This bias, conscious or not, stems from the belief that women can only say things well “if borrowed from men or assisted by them,” as Astell notes in Some Reflections upon Marriage. By comparing Astell’s and Descartes’ views on the knowledge seeker, we can see significant differences. Abandoning the “Astell as Descartes” framework reveals Astell as a virtue epistemologist, offering a fresh perspective on her work that impacts both Descartes studies and contemporary epistemology.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Cartesianism and Philosophy of Mind |
| Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
| Pages | 281-296 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781040506011 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781032853079 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2026 selection and editorial matter, Vili Lähteenmäki, Oberto Marrama, and Jani Sinokki; individual chapters, the contributors.
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