Abstract
We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals which lead to our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school optimal matchings, assuming worst-case preferences (for schools and students) in large markets.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015 |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
Pages | 1890-1903 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Edition | January |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781611973747 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015 - San Diego, United States Duration: Jan 4 2015 → Jan 6 2015 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms |
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Number | January |
Volume | 2015-January |
Other
Other | 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2015 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | San Diego |
Period | 1/4/15 → 1/6/15 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:Copyright © 2015 by the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathmatics.