Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks

Ahmet Yasin Yazicioglu; Xiaoli Ma; Yucel Altunbasak

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14

Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks

Ahmet Yasin Yazicioglu, Xiaoli Ma, Yucel Altunbasak

Chemical Engineering and Materials Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

The spread of cooperation in the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games such as Prisoner's Dilemma can be facilitated by various means such as topological heterogeneities, a high benefit-to-cost ratio, or asymmetric interactions. In evolutionary dynamics, the agents adopt the strategies of neighbors with higher payoffs with a probability proportional to the payoff difference. In this study, we analyze evolutionary dynamics of mixed strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game through the expected value of the payoff difference for arbitrary neighbors and the evolutionary advantage/disadvantage of nodes due to the degree distributions within their neighborhoods. Simulation results for various networks and game parameters are also presented.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Pages	190-204
Number of pages	15
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14
State	Published - Jul 31 2012
Event	2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China Duration: Apr 16 2011 → Apr 18 2011

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume	75 LNICST
ISSN (Print)	1867-8211

Other

Other	2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
Country/Territory	China
City	Shanghai
Period	4/16/11 → 4/18/11

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10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14

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Yazicioglu, A. Y., Ma, X., & Altunbasak, Y. (2012). Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 190-204). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14

Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks. / Yazicioglu, Ahmet Yasin; Ma, Xiaoli; Altunbasak, Yucel.

Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. p. 190-204 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 75 LNICST).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Yazicioglu, AY, Ma, X & Altunbasak, Y 2012, Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks. in Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 75 LNICST, pp. 190-204, 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011, Shanghai, China, 4/16/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14

Yazicioglu AY, Ma X, Altunbasak Y. Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks. In Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. p. 190-204. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_14

Yazicioglu, Ahmet Yasin ; Ma, Xiaoli ; Altunbasak, Yucel. / Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks. Game Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers. 2012. pp. 190-204 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).

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Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks

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