Analyzing the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on structured networks

Ahmet Yasin Yazicioglu, Xiaoli Ma, Yucel Altunbasak

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The spread of cooperation in the evolutionary dynamics of social dilemma games such as Prisoner's Dilemma can be facilitated by various means such as topological heterogeneities, a high benefit-to-cost ratio, or asymmetric interactions. In evolutionary dynamics, the agents adopt the strategies of neighbors with higher payoffs with a probability proportional to the payoff difference. In this study, we analyze evolutionary dynamics of mixed strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game through the expected value of the payoff difference for arbitrary neighbors and the evolutionary advantage/disadvantage of nodes due to the degree distributions within their neighborhoods. Simulation results for various networks and game parameters are also presented.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationGame Theory for Networks - Second International ICST Conference, GAMENETS 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Pages190-204
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 31 2012
Event2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Apr 16 2011Apr 18 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Volume75 LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Other

Other2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory in Networks, GAMENETS 2011
Country/TerritoryChina
CityShanghai
Period4/16/114/18/11

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