An equilibrium result for games with private information and infinitely many players

E. J. Balder, A. Rustichini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

Balder (Math. Oper. Res.13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players. Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)385-393
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume62
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1994

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