An equilibrium result for games with private information and infinitely many players

E. J. Balder; A. Rustichini

doi:10.1006/jeth.1994.1021

An equilibrium result for games with private information and infinitely many players

E. J. Balder, A. Rustichini

Economics (Twin Cities)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

Balder (Math. Oper. Res.13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players. Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	385-393
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	62
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1021
State	Published - Apr 1994

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10.1006/jeth.1994.1021

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title = "An equilibrium result for games with private information and infinitely many players",

abstract = "Balder (Math. Oper. Res.13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players. Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.",

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An equilibrium result for games with private information and infinitely many players

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