Alethic pluralism, generic truth and mixed conjunctions

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Abstract

A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic pluralism worth investigating further, does not constitute an effective objection to it.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)624-629
Number of pages6
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume61
Issue number244
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2011

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