TY - JOUR
T1 - Alethic pluralism, generic truth and mixed conjunctions
AU - Cook, Roy T
PY - 2011/7/1
Y1 - 2011/7/1
N2 - A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic pluralism worth investigating further, does not constitute an effective objection to it.
AB - A difficulty for alethic pluralism has been the idea that semantic evaluation of conjunctions whose conjuncts come from discourses with distinct truth properties requires a third notion of truth which applies to both of the original discourses. But this line of reasoning does not entail that there exists a single generic truth property that applies to all statements and all discourses, unless it is supplemented with additional, controversial, premises. So the problem of mixed conjunctions, while highlighting other aspects of alethic pluralism worth investigating further, does not constitute an effective objection to it.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.706.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.706.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79959692755
SN - 0031-8094
VL - 61
SP - 624
EP - 629
JO - Philosophical Quarterly
JF - Philosophical Quarterly
IS - 244
ER -